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ARTICLE
“RECEPTION” AND “CONVERGENCE”
OF JAPANESE AND GERMAN
CORPORATE LAW
EIJI TAKAHASHI*
INTRODUCTION
The traditional relationship between Japanese and German corporate
law has been characterized as the “reception” by the former of the latter.
However, in recent years, the development of both Japanese and German
corporate law has been modeled on U.S. law. In this article, I term the
phenomenon in which the content of the two corporate laws grow increas-
ingly similar to U.S. law “convergence,” and aim to identify and address
some issues concerning this new phenomenon.
In Part I, I shed light on the Japanese reception of German corporate
law by locating the issues involved. In Part II, I use the examples of the
shareholder’s derivative action and the business judgment rule to elaborate
on the new relationship of “convergence” between the two nations’ corpo-
rate laws. I then discuss the problems caused by this new phenomenon and
conclude with a list of suggestions.
I. RECEPTION OF GERMAN CORPORATE LAW BY JAPAN
A. The Traditional Relationship between Japanese and German
Corporate Law: Systems Reception and Theory Reception
The influence of German law on Japanese civil law is often described
as “theory reception” by the latter of the former.1 However, the systems
* Director of the J.D. Program and Professor of Law, Osaka City University Graduate
School of Law. This paper is also published in Zeitschrft fu¨r Japanischnes Recht Nr. 38. I wish to
thank Mr. Alan K. Koh of the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law for his assistance
in editing this paper. Japanese authors mentioned or cited in this paper are named in the Last
Name-First Name order that is proper to East Asian names except where they are named in the
reverse order in a western publication.
1. ZENTARO KITAGAWA, REZEPTION UND FORTBILDUNG DES EUROP ¨AISCHEN ZIVILRECHT IN
JAPAN [RECEPTION AND CONTINUING EDUCATION OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW IN JAPAN] 67 et seq.
(1970).
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aspect has drawn more attention than the theory aspect when it comes to the
influence of German law on the Japanese Commercial Code. For example,
the former Japanese Commercial Code (Sho¯ho¯) was drafted by Hermann
Roesler, and much of the content was drawn from the provisions of the
German General Commercial Code of 1861 (the Allgemeine Deutsche
Handelsgesetzbuch, “ADHGB”).2 The influence of German law on the con-
tent of the former Limited Liability Company Act (Yu¯gen Kaishaho¯) en-
acted in 1938 was also striking.3 German law continues to exert great
influence on the theoretical aspects of Japanese corporate law even today.
B. Japanese Corporate Law Concepts of German Origin
1. The Fundamental Nature of the Stock Corporation
Since the ADHGB of 1861, German law has had a conceptual defini-
tion of the stock corporation. The definition in Article 207 of the ADHGB
is as follows: “A commercial corporation is a stock corporation if its mem-
bers participate only through contributing capital, and bear no liability for
corporate obligations. Corporate capital is divided into shares or share inter-
ests.”4 The Imperial German Commercial Code (the Handelsgezetzbuch,
“HGB”) of 1897 replaced the term “corporate capital” with “paid-in capi-
tal” or “share capital” and continued using the ADHGB definition almost
word-for-word.5
The founder of Japanese corporate law studies, Dr. Okano Keijiro¯,
who studied under Otto von Gierke in Berlin, adopted the 1861 General
Commercial Code definition of the stock corporation as an academic con-
cept for Japan’s stock corporation. He also elaborated on the following
three features of Japan’s stock corporation in 1929: one, “the fixed fund
created by the capital contribution of the members”6; two, “the capital is
2. ANNA BARTELS-ISHIKAWA, HERMANN ROESLER: DOKUMENTE ZU SEINEM LEBEN UND
WERK [HERMANN ROESLER: DOCUMENTS ON HIS LIFE AND WORK] 62 (2007).
3. SAKAMAKI TOSHIO, HEISATEKI KAISHA NO H ¯ORI TO RIPP ¯O [PRINCIPLES AND LEGISLATION
OF CLOSED COMPANIES] 238 (1973); ¯OTORI TSUNEO, Y ¯UGEN KAISHAH ¯O NO KENKY ¯U [STUDIES IN
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW] 70 (1965); Harald Baum & Eiji Takahashi, Commercial and
Corporate Law in Japan, Legal and Economic Developments after 1868, in HISTORY OF LAW IN
JAPAN SINCE 1868, at 343 (Wilhelm Ro¨hl ed., 2005).
4. The definition of a stock corporation under the Aktiengesetz currently in force is more
polished. As defined by Article 1(1), “The company is a stock corporation that constitutes a sepa-
rate legal entity. Liability to creditors with respect to obligations of the company shall be limited
to the company’s assets.” Article 1(2) states, “The company shall have a capital divided into
shares.” Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, last
amended by Gesetz [G], July 23, 2013, BGBL. I at 2586, art. 1 (Ger.), translated in Norton Rose
Fulbright, German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz): English translation as of September 18,
2013, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-109100.pdf.
5. HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], 1897, art. 207(1)–(2) (Ger.).
6. OKANO KEIJIR ¯O, CORPORATE LAW 207 et seq. (Yuhikaku ed., 1929).
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divided into a certain number of shares”7; three, “the liability of each mem-
ber is limited.”8
Dr. Suzuki Takeo adopted Dr. Okano’s ideas, and following Karl Leh-
mann,9 characterized the stock corporation’s distinctive features as shares,
limited liability, and capital.10 This remains accepted as the traditional doc-
trine in Japan.11
2. The Three Principles of Capital
German legal science emphasized two principles concerning the capi-
tal of stock corporations. In 1898, Karl Lehmann argued that the principle
of fixed share capital (Prinzip des festen Grundkapitals) should apply to the
capital of a stock corporation, and that the defined value of assets to be
contributed as capital should be clearly stated.12 Lehmann also argued that
the “principle of stability of share capital (Prinzip der Besta¨ndigkeit des
Grundkapitals) should apply, and that once decided, the share capital
amount should not be arbitrarily changed.”13
Initially, Japanese doctrine simply followed Lehmann’s principals. In
1916, Dr. Matsumoto Jo¯ji argued in support of the principles of fixed share
capital and maintenance of capital. On the principle of maintenance of capi-
tal, Dr. Matsumoto accepted Lehmann’s Prinzip der Besta¨ndigkeit des
Grundkapitals, arguing that this “means that capital cannot be arbitrarily
changed.”14
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 2 KARL LEHMANN, DAS RECHT DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN 158 et seq. (1898).
10. However, Suzuki saw capital as a creation of legal policy that takes into consideration the
consequences of the regime of shareholders’ limited liability. Therefore, to Suzuki, the features of
the stock corporation are in that sense secondary characteristics. SUZUKI TAKEO, KAISHAHO [COR-
PORATE LAW] 19 (rev. ed. 1956).
11. MORIMOTO SHIGERU, KAISHAH ¯O SH ¯OK ¯OIH ¯O TEGATAH ¯O K ¯OGI [LECTURES ON CORPORATE
LAW, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, AND BILLS] 28 et seq. (2d ed. 2011); MAEDA HITOSHI, KAISHAH ¯O
NY ¯UMON [INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE LAW] 18 et seq. (12th ed. 2009); ¯OSUMI KENICHIR ¯O,
IMAI HIROSHI & KOBAYASHI RY ¯O, SHIN-KAISHAH ¯O GAISETSU [AN OUTLINE OF THE NEW COMPA-
NIES ACT] 19 et seq. (2d ed. 2010); TAKAHASHI EIJI, KAISHAHO GAISETSU [AN OUTLINE OF COR-
PORATE LAW] 37 (2d ed. 2014). In contrast, Professors Egashira Kenjiro¯ and Kanda Hideki argue
that of shares, limited liability, and capital, only limited liability is a fundamental distinguishing
feature of the stock corporation. EGASHIRA KENJIR ¯O, KABUSHIKI KAISHAH ¯O [STOCK CORPORA-
TIONS LAW] 32 et seq. (4th ed. 2011); KANDA HIDEKI, KAISHAH ¯O [CORPORATE LAW] 26 (14th ed.
2012).
12. LEHMANN, supra note 9, at 167.
13. Id. at 168.
14. MATSUMOT ¯O J ¯OJI, KAISHAH ¯O K ¯OGI [LECTURES ON CORPORATE LAW] 208 et seq. (1916).
Matsumoto’s “principle of maintenance of capital” was what Lehmann called “the principle of
stability of capital,” and corresponds to today’s “principle of constant capital” (Shihon Huhen no
Gensoku). TAKAHASHI, supra note 11, at 39.
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Subsequently in 1928, Rudolf Mu¨ller-Erzbach emphasized the suffi-
ciency of the capital fund (Das Aufbringung des Grundkapitals)15 and the
continuous maintenance of the capital fund (Die dauernde Erhaltung des
Grundkapitals)16 as the distinctive features of stock corporation capital. He
also elaborated on the obligation to contribute the equivalent of the full
capital sum from the perspective of capital sufficiency, and the prohibition
on the return of contributed capital and corporate purchase of its own stock
from the perspective of capital maintenance.17
Based on Lehmann’s theory, and taking into account Mu¨ller-Erzbach’s
opinion, Dr. Okano explained the necessity for the entirety of a corpora-
tion’s share capital to be subscribed as the principle of fixed share capital,
and that from this principle is derived the principles of constant capital and
capital fund maintenance.18 Regarding the principle of capital maintenance,
Okano reasoned that “property equivalent to the share capital amount must
be kept as the economic foundation of the corporation.”19 The foundations
of the three principles of capital in Japanese corporate law were thus laid.
The three principles of capital became the established doctrine through the
efforts of Dr. Suzuki20 and remained the leading doctrine until the 2005
amendments.21
The legislative draftsmen of the Companies Act of 2005 took the view
that the new statute did not incorporate the duty to ensure capital suffi-
ciency in its traditional sense. This view was based on the abolishment of
the promoter’s duty of warranty of subscription22 and duty of warranty of
contribution.23 Since then, academic opinion has been divided on the ques-
tion of whether the three principles of capital remain applicable to the re-
gime under the Companies Act of 2005. Although the majority opinion is
that the three principles remain relevant to the Companies Act,24 Professor
Kanda Hideki argues that of the three principles, only the principle of capi-
15. RUDOLF M ¨ULLER-ERZBACH, DEUTSCHES HANDELSRECHT [GERMAN COMMERCIAL LAW]
247 et seq. (3d ed. 1928).
16. Id. at 249 et seq.
17. Id.
18. OKANO, supra note 6, at 209.
19. Id. at 208 et seq.
20. SUZUKI, supra note 10, at 24 et seq.
21. NISHIHARA KAN’ICHI, KAISHAH ¯O (SH ¯OH ¯O K ¯OGI II) [CORPORATE LAW (LECTURES ON
COMMERCIAL LAW II)] 76 et seq. (1969).
22. Art. 192(1), pre-2005 Sho¯ho¯ (Comm. C.).
23. Id. Art. 192(2); Ko¯riya Daisuke & Iwasaki Tomohiko, Kaishaho¯ ni okeru Saikensha
Hogo (jo¯) [Creditor Protection in the Companies Act (Part 1)], 1764 SH ¯OJI H ¯OMU 52 (2005).
Previously, promoters and directors at formation of the stock corporation were liable to subscribe
for any shares left unsubscribed, and to pay in any capital contribution not paid in by subscribing
members.
24. EGASHIRA, supra note 11, at 35 et seq.; MAEDA, supra note 11, at 21 et seq.; TAKAHASHI,
supra note 11, at 38 et seq.
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tal maintenance survives, as members are disenfranchised if they fail to
discharge their duty to pay in share capital.25
The three principles of capital that Japanese law acquired from Ger-
man law were useful conceptual tools for explaining the principles of cor-
porate finance. However, the enactment of the Companies Act of 2005
narrowed the field to which the three principles of capital are applicable.
Japanese corporate legal studies now face the challenge of returning to the
founding spirit of the field and of discovering and developing a coherent
theory inherent within the structure of corporate finance.
3. Corporation-in-Formation
The leading theory in early German doctrine described pre-incorpora-
tion legal relationships as that of a partnership of promoters. In 1864, Paul
Laband explained the relationship of share subscribers by arguing that dur-
ing pre-incorporation, there existed at least a partnership of promoters, and
it is to this partnership that subscribers of shares owe the duty to pay in
capital.26
In contrast, Otto von Gierke argued in 1887 that “if the law recognizes
an established association, then the law cannot refuse to recognize an asso-
ciation undergoing the establishment process. The fixed realm of legal prin-
ciples that govern life within the public body also covers its life during the
infancy of the public body.”27 In making this argument, Gierke had in mind
the stock corporation as an example of such an association.
Building on the work of scholars like Otto von Gierke,28 Dr. Tanaka
Ko¯taro¯ drew a parallel between the existence of this pre-incorporation form
with the existence of a fetal stage before an infant human’s birth. He argued
that corporations also had a fetal stage, which he called the “corporation-in-
formation,” and structured his theory of the legal relationships involved
around that concept.29 As to the motive behind the concept of the corpora-
tion-in-formation, he later reflected:
The birth of an organizational body such as the stock corpo-
ration is not a single act, nor would a single act suffice to make it
happen. First the promoters must create the articles of incorpora-
tion, followed by a subscription for shares, issuance, paying in of
25. KANDA, supra note 11, at 268.
26. Paul Laband, Rezension: Renaud, Das Recht der Actiengesellschaften [Review: Renaud’s
The Law of Stock Corporations], 7 ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 617, 620 (1864).
27. OTTO VON GIERKE, DIE GENOSSENSCAHFTSTHEORIE UND DIE DEUTSCHE RECHTSPRECHUNG
[THE ASSOCIATION THEORY AND GERMAN CASE LAW] 135 et seq. (1887).
28. 1 OTTO VON GIERKE, DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL UND PER-
SONENRECHT [GERMAN PRIVATE LAW: GENERAL PART AND THE LAW OF PERSONS] 486 et seq.
(1895); GIERKE, supra note 27, at 135 et seq. R
29. TANAKA K ¯OTAR ¯O, G ¯OMEI-KAISHA SEKININ-RON [ON LIABILITY IN UNLIMITED COMPA-
NIES] 376 et seq. (1919).
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capital, holding of the meeting of formation . . . . Thus it is by
going through the stages that a corporation is born, a process
strikingly similar to how a fetus grows in stages in the mother’s
body, and becomes a complete person upon birth. Accordingly, I
conceptualized the promoters as an organ of the fetal corporation,
and attempted to ground the basis of promoters’ obligations in
their status as such.30
He characterizes this approach as “[one from] a sociological perspective
. . . . observing legal persons in a biological, organic way. In other words,
its theoretical foundation is not that of a Romanistic, individualistic theory
of private law, but rather of Germanistic collectivism.”31 The theory of
“corporation-in-formation” first introduced into Japanese law by Dr.
Tanaka still receives support from lower court judgments32 and prevailing
doctrinal thought to this day.33
However, the concept of the corporation-in-formation in prevailing
Japanese legal thought differs from its German counterpart in one distinct
respect. Under German law, there is an initial agreement between the pro-
moters to form the corporation—“the partnership of promoters” (Vor-
gru¨ndungsgesellschaft). By accomplishing the purpose of this partnership,
which is to determine the articles of incorporation,34 the partnership is dis-
solved.35 Subsequently, the rights and duties of the partnership of promoters
are succeeded by the corporation-in-formation (Vorgesellschaft), and the
corporation in turn succeeds the rights and duties of the corporation-in-for-
mation with the registration of formation. The German theory, therefore, is
that the growth of the corporation progresses in stages.36
In contrast, in Japanese law, the corporation-in-formation and the part-
nership of promoters are competing concepts. In prevailing Japanese
doctrine:
[T]he partnership of promoters, which is a partnership formed
under the civil law . . . does not develop into a corporation-in-
formation, but rather co-exists separately from the corporation-in-
formation. It is just that the promoters, who are both members and
an organ of the corporation-in-formation, and the members of the
partnership of promoters are, as explained above, the same insofar
as the personal aspect is involved. Also, the corporation-in-forma-
30. YANAGISAWA TAKESHI, IKITEKITA MICHI (TANAKA K ¯OTAR ¯O) [THE PATH I HAVE LIVED
(MEMOIRS OF TANAKA KOTARO)] 121 (1950, reprinted 1997).
31. Id. at 122.
32. To¯kyo¯ ko¯sai [Tokyo High Ct.] Jul. 26, 1976, 831 HANREI JIH ¯O 94 (Japan); To¯kyo¯ ko¯sai
[Tokyo High Ct.] May 23, 1989, 1252 KIN’Y ¯U H ¯OMU JIJ ¯O 24 (Japan).
33. EGASHIRA, supra note 11, at 105 n.2; KANDA, supra note 11, at 55 et seq.
34. Art. 726, Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] (Ger.).
35. Article 726 of the German Civil Code states that a partnership formed under civil law is
dissolved by accomplishing its stated purpose. Id.
36. Friedrich Ku¨bler & Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht [Law of Organizations]
377 et seq. (6th ed. 2006).
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tion and the partnership of promoters are closely connected. That
is to say, the creation of the articles of incorporation, subscription
of shares and the performance of duties necessary for the forma-
tion of the corporation and the like by the promoters are, to the
corporation-in-formation, the creation of its constitution, forma-
tion and the operations of its organ. However, to the partnership
of promoters, such acts are the performance of the partnership
agreement.37
The jurisprudence of the lower courts in Japan also takes the view that the
partnership of promoters and corporation-in-formation co-exist.38
After 1970, Flume argued that the fundamental nature of a partnership
at civil law is that of collective ownership (Gesamthand), where the rights
and duties of the partnership belong to the partners as a collective.39 This
became prevailing doctrine.40 It was a result of characterizing the civil law
partnership as a type of collective, an idea that originated in German law.
The 1994 Reorganization Act enabled the change from an organization
of persons to an organization of capital.41 This change brought strong argu-
ments that partnerships in civil law have legal personality.42 In addition, on
January 29, 2001, the Federal Court of Justice handed down a decision rec-
ognizing the legal capacity of the external partnership in civil law.43 At
Flume’s centennial memorial symposium, Karsten Schmidt said, “I am be-
ginning to wonder if the Ko¨rperschaft and the external organization of per-
sons are but just separately regulated legal persons.”44
The legal nature of the partnership of promoters is thought to be that of
a partnership in civil law. But consider the possibility of introducing into
Japanese law the new idea, recognized by German judicial precedent, that a
partnership in civil law has legal capacity. If so introduced, legal relation-
37. Kitazawa Masahiro, Setsuritsu-chu¯ no Kaisha to Hokkinin Kumiai [The Corporation-in-
Formation and the Partnership of Promoters], in 5 KEIYAKUH ¯O TAIKEI (TOKUSHU NO KEIYAKU 1)
[COMPENDIUM OF CONTRACT LAW (SPECIFIC CONTRACTS 1)] 116 (Keiyakuho¯ Taikei Kanko¯
I’inkai ed., 1963). For a similar view, see SUZUKI TAKEO & TAKEUCHI AKIO, KAISHAH ¯O [CORPO-
RATE LAW] 56 (3d ed. 1994).
38. To¯kyo¯ Chiho¯ Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 21, 1992, 1434 HANREI JIH ¯O 54 (Japan).
39. 1 WERNER FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES B ¨URGERLICHEN RECHTS: TEIL 1, DIE PER-
SONENGESELLSCHAFT [THE GENERAL PART OF CIVIL LAW: PART 1, THE ASSOCIATION OF PERSONS]
56 (1977).
40. According to Karsten Schmidt, an external partnership under civil law is a Gesamthand-
sgesellschaft. KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [LAW OF ORGANIZATIONS] 1697 (4th ed.
2002).
41. Ko¯sei-ho¯ [Reorganization Act] art. 214(1) (1994) (Japan).
42. Thomas Raiser, Gesamthand und juirstische Person im Licht des neuen Umwandlung-
srechts [Collective Ownership and the Legal Person in Light of the New Reorganization Act], 194
ARCHIV F ¨UR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 495, 505, 511 (1994) (Japan).
43. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 29, 2001, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 146, 341 (Ger.).
44. Karsten Schmidt, Die Personengesellschaft als Rechtsfigur des ‘Allgemeinen Teils’ [The
Organization of Persons as a Legal Construct of the ‘General Part’], 209 ARCHIV F ¨UR DIE
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 181, 202 (2009).
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ships created while a corporation is in formation would belong to the part-
nership of promoters, and it would suffice to say that these relationships
would simply be succeeded by a corporation formally brought into exis-
tence upon registration. It is necessary to consider, in this case, whether the
competing concept of corporation-in-formation is truly necessary.45
4. The Dualism of the Act of Electing a Director and the Contract
of Appointment
German law distinguishes between the election (Bestellung) and the
appointment (Anstellung) of directors. This is called the “separation princi-
ple” (Trennungstheorie).46 According to German law, election is an act
under corporate law and refers to the act of the relevant party (the would-be
director) becoming the corporate organ of “director” by his acceptance. Ap-
pointment, on the other hand, refers to the creation of contractual relation-
ships between the corporation and each individual director. To end a
relationship of appointment, the appointment contract must be terminated.47
In such a case, in order to terminate an employment relationship without a
fixed term, there must be one or more important grounds for termination as
pursuant to Article 626 of the Civil Code.
The consensus in Japanese law is that election of a director is a unilat-
eral act conditioned upon the acceptance of the elected person, which be-
comes effective with the shareholder resolution electing the director and the
elected person’s acceptance.48 On the other hand, Dr. ¯Osumi Kenichiro¯ and
Dr. Imai Hiroshi, influenced by the separation principle from German law,
argue that the election of directors has, in addition to its organizational law
aspect (in the sense of making the elected persons part of a corporate law
organ), a personal law aspect in the sense that the elected person has to bear
the personal duty of providing labor as a director. Therefore, according to
¯Osumi and Imai, the consensus understanding of election as a unilateral act
cannot explain the personal law aspect.49
Japanese corporate law contains rules premised on the consensus that
removal of directors constitutes a unilateral act. Specifically, under Japa-
nese corporate law, a corporation may remove a director at any time.50 In
contrast with German law, which is premised on the separation principle,
the contract of appointment loses effect at the same time as the termination
of the director. A removed director has a right to claim damages for “remu-
45. TAKAHASHI, supra note 11, at 44.
46. See AktG art. 84(1)(5).
47. 79 BGHZ 38 (41) (Ger.).
48. SUZUKI & TAKEUCHI, supra note 37, at 270 n.9.
49. See ¯OSUMI KENICHIR ¯O & IMAI HIROSHI, KAISHAH ¯ORON CH ¯UKAN [ON CORPORATE LAW,
MIDDLE PART] 149 et seq. (3d ed. 1992).
50. Kaisha-ho¯ [Companies Act] art. 339(1) (Japan).
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neration that should have been received.”51 However, where the removal
was for proper grounds, the removed director loses the right to damages.52
The German-influenced separation principle is effective in the protec-
tion of directors in their role as laborers. Under German law, even if a
director is removed, so long as there are no grounds for the termination of
the appointment contract, the appointment contract continues to be in effect,
and the director does not lose his right to claim remuneration.53 Japanese
law, on the other hand, aims to safeguard the right to remuneration within a
tort framework by framing the right to remuneration as the right to claim
“loss of benefits that should have been received.”54 However, under this
framework, the burden of proof as to the amount of benefits that should
have been received falls on the director. On this point, as compared with the
German separation doctrine, the protection of directors as persons receiving
remuneration is weaker. Because a removed director bears the burden of
proving her losses (benefits that should have been received), where the di-
rector’s remuneration (1) takes the form of stock options,55 (2) varies with
corporate performance, or (3) is otherwise uncertain,56 the director’s burden
of proof can be difficult depending on how the remuneration is to be
determined.
If we follow the German-theory-inspired views of ¯Osumi Kenichiro¯
and Imai Hiroshi, and follow the separation principle to its logical conclu-
sion, we should amend Article 339(2) of the Companies Act. The amend-
ment should make clear that the removal of a director does not
automatically terminate the director’s contract, that special grounds are re-
quired to terminate the appointment contract, and that the director does not
lose his right to claim remuneration upon removal.57
51. Companies Act art. 339(2) (Japan).
52. Japanese Companies Act Article 339(2) establishes a form of legal responsibility that is
aimed at balancing the guarantee of the freedom of shareholders to remove their directors on the
one hand, and on the other hand, the protection of the expectation of a director with regards to his
term of appointment. See ¯OSAKA K ¯OT ¯O SAIBANSHO [OSAKA HIGH CT.] Jan. 30, 1981, 32(1-4)
KAKY ¯U SAIBANSHO MINJI SAIBAN [KAMINSHU]  17. Therefore, the amount of compensation should
be the amount of benefit that a director would have received at the end of his term of office if he
had not been removed. See EGASHIRA, supra note 11, at 372 n.7.
53. THOMAS RAISER & R ¨UDIGER VEIL, RECHT DER KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN [THE LAW OF
STOCK CORPORATIONS] 129 et seq. (5th ed. 2010).
54. Companies Act art. 339(2) (Japan).
55. Id. art. 361(1)(1), (3).
56. See Takahashi Eiji, in CHIKUJ ¯O KAISETSU KAISHAH ¯O DAI 4-KAN KIKAN 1 [ARTICLE-BY-
ARTICLE COMMENTARY OF THE COMPANIES ACT VOL. 4 ORGANS 1] 465 et seq. (Sakamaki Toshio
& Tatsuta Misao eds., 2008).
57. See TAKAHASHI EIJI, DOITSU KAISHA-H ¯O GAISETSU [AN OUTLINE OF GERMAN COMPANY
LAW] 150 (2012).
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C. Reception of German Legal Doctrine in Japanese Lawmaking
1. Shareholder’s Duty of Loyalty
The birth of inquiry into the shareholder’s duty of loyalty in Japan was
contemporaneous with the beginning of Nazi law research in Japan. At that
time, some scholars, influenced by Nazi legal thought, actively advocated
the introduction of a shareholder’s duty of loyalty doctrine.58 However, pre-
vailing legal thought did not recognize such a duty. As Tanaka argued:
The shareholder’s duty is none other than the duty of capital con-
tribution . . . . Once the subscription has been paid in[,] neither
that shareholder nor those who acquire those shares bear any obli-
gation. A legal relationship of loss sharing also does not arise as
between the members, unlike a general partnership company.
This is shareholders’ limited liability, a core principle of stock
corporation law first clearly articulated in the commercial codes
of France, the Netherlands, and Spain.59
Also drawing on the principle of shareholders’ limited liability, ¯Osumi ar-
gued that “ordinarily, shareholder rights do not include any obligations.”60
Suzuki, who led the field of corporate law studies in postwar Showa-
era Japan, argued that, viewed formalistically, “a stock corporation is not a
contractual association of members, but rather is formed from corporation-
member relationships with the group as the axis.”61 This draws a rigid dis-
tinction between the civil law partnership and the corporate nature of the
stock corporation. He further argued that although shareholders’ collective
rights were introduced to protect their individual rights:
[I]t is difficult to imagine that it would be acceptable for share-
holders, in the exercise of their collective rights, to insist upon
only their personal interests and improperly infringe upon the in-
terests of other shareholders. At the very least, such a level of
consideration is to be expected, even if the relationship of trust
between shareholders does not rise to the level of that in a real
partnership. I am of the view that the shareholder’s duty of loy-
alty as recognized by recent German doctrine may and should be
recognized within the boundaries and upon the grounds as set out
above.62
58. See Eiji Takahashi, Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz und Treuepflicht im japanischen
Gesellschaftsrecht [Principle of Equal Treatment and the Duty of Loyalty in Japanese Corporate
Law], in DIE BEDEUTUNG DER RECHTSDOGMATIK F ¨UR DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG [THE IMPOR-
TANCE OF LEGAL DOGMA IN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT] 261, 270 et seq. (Rolf Stu¨rner ed., 2010).
59. TANAKA K ¯OTAR ¯O, KAISEI KAISHAH ¯O RON [ON THE REVISED CORPORATE LAW] 459 et
seq. (1939).
60. ¯OSUMI KENICHIR ¯O, ZENTEI KAISHAH ¯O RON J ¯O-KAN [ON THE COMPLETELY REVISED COR-
PORATE LAW, VOL. 1] 265 (1964).
61. Suzuki Takeo, Kaisha no Shadan Ho¯jin-sei [The Personal Association Nature of the Cor-
poration], in 2 SH ¯OH ¯O KENKY ¯U: KAISHAH ¯O (1) [II STUDIES IN COMMERCIAL LAW: CORPORATE
LAW (1)] 17 (1971).
62. Id. at 21.
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These views of Suzuki found fruition in the “abuse of majority vote
doctrine” introduced by the 1981 revisions to the Commercial Code. Article
247(1)(iii), as enacted that year, established a basis for setting aside a share-
holder resolution at a shareholders’ meeting “where an extremely improper
resolution is passed due to the exercise of voting rights by a shareholder for
whom the resolution presents a special conflict of interest.”63 However,
scholars were reluctant to go beyond the abuse of majority vote doctrine to
recognize a shareholder’s duty of loyalty.
However, in Germany following the 1970s, the position that a share-
holder’s duty of loyalty should be recognized came to prevail in legal
thought.64 With the recognition of a duty of loyalty between shareholders in
the Linotype decision of the German Federal Supreme Court on February 1,
1988,65 scholars began to argue that such developments in German jurispru-
dence should also be received into Japanese law.66
The Interim Recommendations on Corporate Law Reform, issued by
the Ministry of Justice Civil Affairs Bureau Counsel’s Office in December
2011, proposed clear language providing for the “liability of natural persons
deemed to have similar influence as a parent corporation in view of their
voting power.”67
The shareholder’s duty of loyalty has a flaw in that it fails to provide a
legal basis for liability for damages where natural persons at the top of a
group company (Konzern) infringe the interests of a subsidiary or a subsidi-
ary of a subsidiary of the controlling corporation. This is because the natu-
ral persons in control at the top of the Konzern are not shareholders of the
harmed corporations unlike corporations, where it is the opposite situa-
tion.68 I therefore suggest that to complement existing regulation in Japa-
nese law, Japan should enact legislation modeled on Article 117 of the
Aktiengesetz, which establishes liability for persons exercising influence
63. Article 247(1)(iii) of the Commercial Code as amended in 1981 corresponds to Article
831(1)(iii) of the Companies Act. On the latter provision, see Harald Baum & Eiji Takahashi,
Klagen gegen fehlerhafte Hauptversammlungsbeschlu¨sse im japanischen Aktienrecht [Suits
against Faulty Resolutions of Shareholder Meetings in Japanese Stock Corporation Law], 32
ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR JAPANISCHES RECHT [JOURNAL OF JAPANESE LAW]  153, 158 et seq. (2011).
64. Cf. Dirk A. Verse, Treuepflicht und Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz [The Duty of Loyalty
and the Principle of Equal Treatment], in 2 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL: GRUNDSATZFRAGEN DES
AKTIENRECHTS [STOCK CORPORATION LAW IN TRANSITION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS IN STOCK
CORPORATION LAW] 579, 595 et seq. (Walter Bayer & Mathias Habersack eds., 2007).
65. 103 BGHZ 184.
66. Cf. Takahashi, supra note 58, at 272.
67. H ¯OMUSH ¯O MINJIKYOKU SANJIKAN-SHITSU [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE CIVIL AFFAIRS BUREAU
COUNSEL’S OFFICE], KAISHAH ¯O-SEI NO MINAOSHI NI KANSURU CH ¯UKAN SHI’AN [INTERIM RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON CORPORATE LAW REFORM] 14 (Dec. 2011).
68. YVES LAKNER, DER MEHRSTUFIGE KONZERN [THE MULTI-LEVEL CORPORATE GROUP] 196
(2005); Takahashi Eiji, Mochibun Kaisha to Kigyo Ketsugo Hosei [Membership Companies and
Regulation of Corporate Groups], 1969 SHOJI HOMU 4, 5 (2012).
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even when there is negligence on their part, as well as when the harm was
pursuant to a shareholder resolution.69
2. Reception of the Duty to Direct in Corporate Group Law
In 1982, Hommelhoff argued that since the capital contribution made
by a parent to a subsidiary is an asset of the parent, the parent’s directors
have the authority and duty to direct the subsidiary.70 Hommelhoff termed
such authority and duty the “Konzern duty of direction.”71 To resolve the
conflict between this duty and authority and the duty of the subsidiary’s
directors,72 Hommelhoff argued that the allocation of authority as between
the directors of the parent and those of the subsidiary should be resolved by
the shareholders’ meeting of the parent corporation.73 Under the influence
of this Konzern duty of direction, there was debate in Japan over whether to
introduce a duty of parent directors to supervise the operations of
subsidiaries.74
The rule that would have established the Konzern duty of direction
was proposed as an alternative in the event that multiple derivative actions
did not make it into the final reform legislation. As it appears likely that
multiple derivative actions will be enacted into law, introduction of the
Konzern duty of direction has been shelved. In my personal view, it is com-
mendable that Japan did not receive the German doctrine on Konzern
direction.75
The problem with the Konzern duty of direction that Japanese corpo-
rate law considered introducing lies in its conflict with the subsidiary’s di-
rectors’ duty of loyalty. Duties in corporate law come hand-in-hand with
authority. Directors of subsidiaries bear the duty to operate the subsidiary
so as to maximize its gains.76 On the other hand, since the parent’s capital
contribution to the subsidiary is part of the parent’s assets, the parent’s di-
69. Takahashi Eiji, Doitsuho¯ ni okeru Eikyo¯ryoku Riyo¯sha no Sekinin Kisei to Nihon no
Kaishaho¯ Kaisei no Kadai [The Liability Regime for Exercisers of Influence in German Law and
Issues in Japanese Corporate Law Reform], in GUR ¯OBARU-KA NO NAKA NO KAISHAH ¯O KAISEI
[CORPORATE LAW REFORM WITHIN GLOBALIZATION] 324 (Kitamura Masashi & Takahashi Eiji
eds., 2014).
70. PETER HOMMELHOFF, DIE KONZERNLEITUNGSPFLICHT [THE KONZERN DUTY OF DIREC-
TION] 418 (1982).
71. Id. at 419.
72. See AktG art. 76.
73. HOMMELHOFF, supra note 70, at 500.
74. There is discussion of introducing a rule that “the board of directors shall supervise the
operations of the corporation’s subsidiaries” in Supplementary Document 23 of the Corporate
Law Subcommittee.
75. Takahashi Eiji, Kigyoˆ shuˆdan niokeru naibu toˆsei [Internal Control in the Corporate
Groups], 1452 JURIST 26, 32 (2013).
76. Kaisha-ho¯ [Kaisha-ho¯] [Companies Act] arts. 330, 350 (Japan); Minpo¯ [Minpo¯] [Civ. C.]
art. 644 (Japan).
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rectors have the duty to increase the value of the capital contribution made
to the subsidiary as part of their duty of loyalty to the parent.
What should happen if directors of the parent order that some measure
be taken to maximize gain to the parent, but the directors of the subsidiary
determine in the exercise of their judgment that the measure harms the in-
terests of the subsidiary? Should the duty of direction of the parent’s board
take precedence, and the subsidiary’s directors be thereby obligated to exe-
cute the measure? Or should the subsidiary’s directors be entitled to refuse,
in accordance with their duty to maximize benefit to the subsidiary?
The duty of direction that Japanese corporate law considered introduc-
ing cannot satisfactorily answer this question. Since the conflict of duties
arises primarily because there are no rules specifying the allocation of au-
thority within a corporate group structure, it may be said that the allocation
of powers should be left to an organ of the parent corporation, as suggested
by Hommelhoff. However, it would exceed its capacity if the parent’s
shareholders’ meeting allocated powers according to Hommelhoff’s propo-
sal.77 A shareholders’ meeting is, after all, akin to a large ship—it lacks the
information on the basis of which to allocate powers between the various
corporate organs within a corporate group. Also, it cannot respond rapidly
to the constantly changing needs of the corporate group. Therefore, recep-
tion of the Konzern duty of direction into Japanese corporate law is not
desirable.
II. CONVERGENCE OF JAPANESE AND GERMAN CORPORATE LAW
A. The New Relationship between Japanese and German Law
In recent years, the content of Japanese and German corporate law has
grown more similar without mutual exchange. Central to the “convergence”
of the corporate laws of these two countries is the law of the United States.
In this section, I shall explain this new phenomenon using the business
judgment rule and the shareholder’s derivative action as case studies.
B. Japanese Law
1. Introduction of the U.S. Business Judgment Rule into Japan
The American business judgment rule came to be studied in Japan rel-
atively early as a topic in comparative law, but Japanese scholars have long
been skeptical of its reception, citing differences between the Japanese and
American legal systems. In 1983, stating the principle as “directors bear no
liability for honest or sincere mistakes in judgment, and the courts do not
77. Bruno Kropff, Zur Konzernleitungspflicht [On the Konzern Duty of Direction], 1984
ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND COR-
PORATE LAW] 112, 124 et seq. (1984).
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intervene in mistakes of judgment,”78 Professor Kawahama Noboru ques-
tioned the appropriateness of introducing the business judgment rule into
Japanese law, and of thereby excluding business judgment from judicial
review. He suggested that although the courts have neither the knowledge
nor experience in managing corporations, they are able to review the appro-
priateness of judgments.79 He also argued that since the suppression of judi-
cial review of business judgment under the American business judgment
rule is closely connected with the American system of civil litigation, to call
the Japanese rule that merely confirms liability for negligence the “business
judgment rule” is to create unnecessary confusion.80
On the other hand, Professor Kondo¯ Mitsuo, in 1989, argued that be-
cause management involves risk and requires specialized knowledge and
expertise that courts lack, it is inappropriate for courts to pass judgment and
impose harsh liability on directors.81 Therefore, courts should recognize
that directors have a certain degree of discretion, and grant deference to
their business judgment.82 Professor Kondo¯’s position later became the
foundation of Japan’s business judgment rule.
2. Structural Impediments Initiative
In September 1989, the Structural Impediments Initiative, a series of
talks aimed at correcting the trade imbalances between Japan and the
United States, was held. The United States identified Japan’s keiretsu sys-
tem, distribution practices, savings patterns, and more as causes of its trade
deficit, and in a bid to improve matters, the United States government cre-
ated a list of suggestions and requested that the Japanese government take
action on those points.83 The American negotiators urged Japan to
strengthen shareholder protection by increasing the degree to which share-
holders may hold managers liable through shareholder lawsuits.84
3. 1993 Revisions
The 1993 revisions included clear language deeming shareholder de-
rivative actions to be claims of a non-calculable nature,85 a change that
caused the claim amount in shareholder derivative actions to be set at JPY
78. Kawahama Noboru, Beikoku ni okeru Kei’ei Handan Gensoku no Kento¯ (1) [A Study of
the Business Judgment Rule in the United States (1)], 114(2) H ¯OGAKU RONS ¯O, 79 et seq. (1984).
79. Id. at 59.
80. Id.
81. KOND ¯O MITSUO, KAISHA KEI’EISHA NO KASHITSU [THE NEGLIGENCE OF CORPORATE
MANAGERS] 180 et seq. (1989).
82. See id.
83. A summary of the list of suggestions by the U.S. government is recorded in NIPPON H ¯OS ¯O
KY ¯OKAI SHUZAI-HAN [NHK], NHK SUPESHARU NICHIBEI NO SH ¯OTOTSU [NHK SPECIAL: U.S.-
JAPAN CONFLICT] 305 et seq. (1990).
84. Id. at 315.
85. Commercial Code art. 267(4) (Japan) (as of 1993 revision).
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950,000 and the filing fees at JPY 8,200.86 Dr. Nakano Tei’ichiro character-
ized the reform as an exceptional one caused by foreign pressure.87 Dr.
Kitazawa Masahiro also clearly identified the Structural Impediments Initi-
ative as the catalyst that eased the bringing of derivative actions.88
As a result of the 1993 revisions to the Commercial Code, filing fees
for shareholder derivative actions came to be treated the same way as non-
calculable claims, such as administrative litigation against local government
authorities. Regardless of the claim amount, all shareholders were allowed
to file a derivative action at the flat rate of JPY 8,200.89
4. Explosion in Shareholder Derivative Actions and the
Development of the Business Judgment Rule
The flat JPY 8,200 filing fee for bringing a shareholder derivative ac-
tion caused an explosion in derivative litigation that could not have been
anticipated by the legislators. Before 1993, there was an average of one
derivative action every two years.90 However, in 1993, the year of the re-
form, shareholders brought thirty-nine actions in that year alone.91 In 1999,
the peak year, 220 derivative actions were brought in the courts.92
In addition, courts began to adjudicate many cases of director liability.
Contemporaneous with the explosion in derivative litigation, Japanese juris-
prudence began to clearly formalize adjudication of duty of care and duty of
loyalty issues, following American legal thought.
Until 1993, no courts in Japan had clearly referred to the business
judgment rule, but instead had held that directors have discretion in matters
of business judgment. If that discretion was exceeded, then the directors
would be liable to the corporation.93
The Tokyo District Court established the form of the business judg-
ment rule in the Cemedine decision of February 8, 1996.94 The controversy
arose when a glue manufacturer called Cemedine Inc. initiated a joint ven-
ture with an American company, Harvey Universal, Inc., for the purpose of
86. Minji sosho¯-ryo¯ ru¯ru [Civil Litigation Fee Rules] art. 4(2), app. 1(1) (Japan).
87. Nakano Tei’ichiro¯, Sosho¯butsu no Kakaku [The Value of Claims], 833 HANREI TAIMUZU
28 (1994).
88. Kitazawa Masahiro, in SHINPAN CH ¯USHAKU KAISHAH ¯O DAINI HOKAN HEISEI 5-NEN
KAISEI [NEW ANNOTATED CORPORATE LAW SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME HEISEI 5 RE-
FORMS], 32 (Ueyanagi Katsuro¯, ¯Otori Tsuneo & Takeuchi Akio eds., 1996).
89. The current filing fee is a flat rate of JPY 13,000.
90. Eiji Takahashi, Corporate Governance in Japan: Vorgriff auf ku¨nftige Reformen in
Deutschland? [Corporate Governance in Japan: In Anticipation of Future Reforms in Germany?],
in VERB ¨ANDE UND ORGANISATION IM JAPANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT [ASSOCIATIONS AND
ORGANIZATION IN JAPANESE AND GERMAN LAW]  81, 89 (Dieter Leipoldt ed., 2006).
91. Id.
92. For the figures, see id. at 89.
93. To¯kyo¯ Chiho¯ Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sep. 21, 1993, 1490 HANREI JIH ¯O 154 (Japan).
94. To¯kyo¯ Chiho¯ Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 8, 1996, 144 SHIRY ¯OBAN SH ¯OJI H ¯OMU
115 (Japan).
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selling glue in the United States. Cemedine and Harvey Universal came
together to create Cemedine USA Inc. As sales remained sluggish,
Cemedine acquired all of Harvey Universal’s shares and assumed Harvey
Universal’s capital contributions.
In this decision, the Tokyo District Court held that “where there is no
mistake that is both important and negligent with respect to the underlying
facts, and there is nothing in the decision making process or content that is
especially unreasonable or inappropriate as corporate managers,”95 direc-
tors breach neither their duty of care nor their duty of loyalty. This holding
came to be known as the “Cemedine formula,”96 and was followed in many
lower court decisions.97
Later, in criminal cases, the Supreme Court of Japan came to recognize
the business judgment rule directly. In the decision of November 9, 2009,98
the Court held the defendants (who included directors of a bank) liable for
criminal breach of trust where the defendants provided unsecured financing
to a client in financial trouble in the knowledge that the loan was not recov-
erable. The Court opined that, in general, “bank directors owe the same
kinds of duties as directors of ordinary corporations, namely, the agent’s
duty of care (Article 644, Civil Code) and the duty of loyalty (Article 254-3
pre-2005 reform Commercial Code, Article 355 Companies Act), and there
is room for the application of the so-called business judgment rule.”99
In the Apamanshop Holdings decision of July 1, 2010,100 the Supreme
Court recognized the application of the business judgment rule to civil
cases. The dispute was over the liability of the parent corporation relating to
the valuation of an acquisition of shares in an unlisted subsidiary. The Su-
preme Court held that “the decision over a corporate reorganization . . . is
left to specialist business judgment . . . . When there is nothing ‘remarkably
unreasonable’ about the process by which [a business decision] is arrived at
or the contents of the decision, the directors do not breach their duty of care
as a prudent manager.”101
95. Tokyo Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 1996, 144 SHIRY ¯OBAN SH ¯OJI H ¯OMU 121 (Japan).
96. Takahashi Eiji, Kanren Kaisha ni taisuru Shi’enkin Kyo¯kyu¯ to Kei’ei Handan Gensoku
[Provision of Financial Support to Related Companies and the Business Judgment Rule], 1747
SH ¯OJI H ¯OMU (2005) 56.
97. See, e.g., ¯Osaka Chiho¯ Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2002, 1109 HANREI
TAIMUZU 226 (Japan); To¯kyo¯ Chiho¯ Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jul. 9, 2005, 1909 HANREI JIH ¯O
87 (Japan).
98. Saiko¯ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 9, 2009, 63(9) KEISH ¯U 1117 (Japan).
99. Id.
100. Saiko¯ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jul. 15, 2010, 2091 HANREI JIH ¯O 90 (Japan). For a case com-
ment, see Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Case No. 21 (Apamanshop Case), in BUSI-
NESS LAW IN JAPAN – CASES AND COMMENTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CIVIL COMMERCIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW – WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF HARALD BAUM 215–26 (Moritz Ba¨lz et
al. eds., 2012).
101. Saiko¯ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jul. 15, 2010, 2091 HANREI JIH ¯O 93 (Japan).
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Following the Apamanshop decision’s formulation of the business
judgment rule, the trend has been for courts to use that formulation as the
standard statement of the business judgment rule.102 Nevertheless, some
lower courts still follow the older Cemendine formula.103
5. Analysis of the Background to the Reception of the Business
Judgment Rule
The 1996 lowering of court filing fees and subsequent explosion in
derivative actions may be identified as the catalyst for the introduction of
the business judgment rule into Japanese law. Together with this trend, the
business judgment rule became progressively formalized in the case law.
The business judgment rule, in its doctrinal logic, avoids suppressing the
entrepreneurial spirit. It functions by severing the connection between mis-
takes in business judgment and civil liability for damages through share-
holder derivative actions and recognizing the discretion of directors on
management matters.
On the background behind the formalization of the business judgment
rule in Japanese law, Professor Kondo¯ Mitsuo argued:
[A]s the Heisei era wore on, cases in which derivative actions
[we]re brought against directors grew in number, and as aware-
ness of the derivative action as a threat grew, awareness of the
business judgment rule amongst the general public grew also. In
response, the courts progressively formalized the business judg-
ment rule. An example is the decision holding that where there is
no mistake that is both important and negligent with respect to the
underlying facts, and there is nothing in the decision-making pro-
cess or content that is especially unreasonable or inappropriate,
the duty of care is not breached.104
C. German Law: The Introduction of the Derivative Action and
Legislative Enactment of the Business Judgment Rule
The 2005 Act on Corporate Integrity and Modernisation of Avoidance
and Rescission Rights (UMAG)105 not only legislatively introduced the
shareholder’s derivative action long advocated in academic circles, but also
enacted into law the business judgment rule long recognized in court
jurisprudence.
102. To¯kyo¯ Chiho¯ Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jan. 27, 2011, unreported, LEX/DB: 25470380
(Japan); To¯kyo¯ Chiho¯ Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Nov. 24, 2153 HANREI JIH ¯O 109 (Japan).
103. See, e.g., Fukoka Chiho¯ Saibansho [Fukoka Dist. Ct.] Apr. 14, 2011, unreported, TKC
Doc. No. 25481284 (Japan).
104. KOND ¯O MITSUO, HANREI H ¯ORI KEI’EI HANDAN GENSOKU [DOCTRINE IN CASE PRECE-
DENT: THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE] 12 (2012).
105. Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrita¨t und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts [UMAG]
[Law on Business Integrity and Modernization of Litigation Law], Sept. 22, 2005, BGBL. at 2802
(Ger.).
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The shareholder’s derivative action, as introduced by the UMAG, per-
mits only shareholders holding over one percent, or over C= 100,000 par
value of shares, to bring suit.106 A shareholder derivative suit may only be
brought with leave of court. The court grants permission only when the
following four criteria are satisfied: (1) the plaintiff shareholder must prove
that her shares are acquired prior to when the breach of duty or loss claimed
becomes publicly known; (2) the plaintiff must prove that her demand, with
the appropriate time period, on the corporation to bring suit had no effect;
(3) the plaintiff must plead facts giving rise to a suspicion that there has
been dishonesty or a serious violation of the law or the corporate constitu-
tion causing loss to the corporation; and (4) there exists no social welfare
policy grounds that trump the bringing of the suit.107
The shareholder plaintiff may bring the derivative action if the court
grants permission,108 and it is this action pursuant to Article 148(3)(1) of
the Aktiengesetz that is the shareholder’s derivative action.
The UMAG also establishes the business judgment rule as follows:
“where the directors reasonably believe that at the time they made the en-
trepreneurial decision they were acting on appropriate information and for
the benefit of the corporation, they do not breach their duty.”109 Writing on
the background of the legislative enactment of the business judgment rule,
Hopt and Markus Roth explained that, “the purpose of the business judg-
ment rule is to balance the increased ease with which directors may be sued
pursuant to Articles 147–149 by establishing a legally-recognized safe har-
bor and space with freedom from liability for directors.”110
As with Japanese law, German law functionally links the formalization
of the business judgment rule to the shareholder’s derivative action. With
the introduction of the shareholder’s derivative action, cases in which share-
holders bring suit against directors for managerial mistakes have increased,
and the legislators’ fears that this would lead to atrophy of corporate man-
agement or even stagnation of the economy took legislative form as the
business judgment rule.
106. AktG art. 148(1).
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 148(3)(1).
109. Id. art. 93(1)(2). For the development of the business judgment rule in German law, see
TAKAHASHI EIJI, DOITSU TO NIHON NI OKERU KABUSHIKI KAISHAH ¯O NO KAIKAKU: K ¯OP ¯OREETO
GABANANSU TO KIGY ¯O KETSUG ¯O H ¯OSEI [STOCK CORPORATION LAW REFORM IN GERMANY AND
JAPAN: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE GROUPS] 212 et seq.
(2007).
110. Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 93 Abs. 1 Satz 2, 4 nF AktG, in AKTG: GRObKOM-
MENTAR, margin no. 8 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. 26th Suppl. 2006).
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D. Issues Arising from the Convergence of German and Japanese
Corporate Law
In general, the “convergence” of corporate law can be classified into
three types according to their causes.
The first type of convergence is that which is caused by competition
amongst the corporate laws of different jurisdictions. This is convergence in
its original sense. An example is that of the competition that has arisen
amongst EU member states sparked by the abandonment of the real seat
doctrine. This convergence led to the abolishment of minimum capital in
limited liability company111 legislation in the member states.112 This type of
convergence has been criticized for the lowering of the quality of corporate
laws as a whole (the phenomenon called the “race to the bottom”), which
results from countries going overboard in their attempt to make their corpo-
rate laws attractive to entrepreneurs for the purpose of attracting incorpora-
tions. However, where corporate laws appropriately provide for investor
and creditor protection, their respective capital markets become more attrac-
tive and create the benefit of raising the credit of a corporation incorporated
in such jurisdictions internationally. Therefore, the competition to deregu-
late in corporate laws will not continue without end. Rather, this competi-
tion will reach—and stop—at a level where the disadvantages of
deregulation begin to outweigh the advantages.
The second type is where an organ created by international treaty or
supranational entity adjusts the corporate laws of the member states and
leads to the harmonization of the contents of corporate laws. For example,
the directives and recommendations of the European Commission have led
to the abolishment of the ultra vires doctrine in the UK113 and the compul-
sory disclosure of individual director’s compensation in Germany.114 This
type of “managed” convergence differs from that caused by competition in
that it occurs under strict planning and careful consideration with a view of
the region to which the convergence will be applicable by the directive-
issuing organ. There are also examples such as the EU Action Plan, which
111. In other words, corporate forms such as the Gesellschaft mit beschra¨nkter Haftung
[GmbH] (limited liability company) (as opposed to the Aktiengesellschaft [AG] (corporation)).
112. Daniel Zimmer, Corporate Law Competition in Europe, 22 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY ECON.
29, 33 et seq. (2010).
113. PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 153 (8th
ed. 2008).
114. See Takahashi Eiji & Yamaguchi Sachiyo, EU ni okeru Kigyo¯ho¯sei Kaikaku no Saishin
Do¯ko¯ (ge): Ko¯do¯ Keikaku no Jitsugen Katei oyobi Doitsu no Kaikaku Jo¯kyo¯ [Latest Developments
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occurs in response to suggestions by leaders and experts (such as the High
Level Group of Company Law Experts).115
The third type of consequence is similar to the first in that it can occur
as the result of an attempt by each jurisdiction’s corporate law legislators to
raise the economic competitiveness of their own respective jurisdictions.
However, it can also occur as a result of many jurisdictions imitating juris-
dictions that have been successful in the world economy. Two jurisdictions
receiving their corporate laws from the same target jurisdiction will come to
have the same content in their corporate law. The convergence of Japanese
and German corporate law falls into the third type, as the content of the law
of these countries became similar despite the absence of mutual exchange
by the two countries because of their reception of corporate law from the
United States, a country considered to be a model because of its economic
success.
Japanese corporate law and corporate law scholarship are moving from
a reception of German law towards convergence with the U.S. model. This
last type of convergence causes a problem—Japan and Germany, in sepa-
rately receiving the same norms without mutual exchange, do not share the
experience garnered by their legal systems.
By comparing Japanese and German corporate law, the following may
be observed: In Japanese law, the business judgment rule remains case law,
stopping at the level of implementation Germany was at as of April 21,
1997, the date of the ARAG/Gamenbeck decision.116 From the perspective
of predictability and certainty of the law, and to formalize the business
judgment rule, Japan should consider legislative enactment of the business
judgment rule, as was done in Germany.
The problem with German shareholder derivative actions is that it is
extremely rare compared to Japan.117 As the shareholder derivative action
has a positive function in improving corporate governance, it is fine for it to
be used more often. For better corporate governance in German enterprises
in the future, from the legal policy perspective of making directors operate
under an appropriate degree of tension caused by the possibility of liability
for unlawful management, relaxing the conditions for bringing shareholder
derivative suits or abolishing the leave procedure should be considered.118
115. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament: Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union - A Plan to Move Forward (May 21, 2003), COM (2003) 284.
116. 135 BGHZ 244 (ARAG/Gamenbeck).
117. For an analysis of the reasons, see Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, Die Aktiona¨rsklage nach
§ 148 AktG [The Shareholder’s Derivative Action under Article 148 of the Aktiengesetz], 40 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT F ¨UR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 398, 406 et seq. (2011).
118. MATHIAS HABERSACK, STAATLICHE UND HALBSTAATLICHE EINGRIFFE IN DIE UN-
TERNEHMENSF ¨UHRUNG, GUTACHTEN E ZUM 69. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG [STATE AND SEMI-STATE
INTERVENTIONS IN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, EXPERT’S REPORT E FOR THE 69TH GERMAN CONFER-
ENCE OF JURISTS] at E 106 (2012). The resolution by the Commercial Law Section of the German
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I make the following suggestions based on findings
from this study:
First, as shown in the process of reception of principles of capital, the
reception of German corporate law theory has had the effect of clarifying
the logic underlying the Japanese stock corporation. Japan has made sense
of the complicated fundamental principles of the stock corporation and cor-
porate finance theory by relying on the strength of German law concepts.
However, postwar Japan has introduced into its corporate law many sys-
tems that cannot be explained by citing German legal doctrine. The new
problem for Japanese corporate law scholarship will be to discover and
make clear a coherent theory that furthers the goals of its own corporate
law.
Second, from a director protection perspective, Japan should incorpo-
rate the separation doctrine from German law and amend Article 339(2) of
the Japanese Companies Act to clarify that, when the director is removed
from his position, such removal does not automatically terminate his or her
employment contract. Therefore, the director does not lose his right to claim
compensation.
Third, the shareholder’s duty of loyalty has been receiving attention as
the latest example of the reception of German corporate law theory in Ja-
pan. However, the shareholder’s duty of loyalty runs into problems when
applied in the multi-level corporate group context. Instead, the protection of
minority shareholders in a dependent subsidiary corporation should be ac-
complished through modification and reception of Article 117 of the
Aktiengesetz.
Fourth, considering the possibility of conflict between the Konzern
duty of direction and the subsidiary’s directors’ duty of loyalty, reception of
the doctrine of the Konzern duty of direction into Japanese corporate law is
not desirable for Japan.
Fifth, to increase predictability in the law, Japan should consider en-
acting the business judgment rule, as it is important to the management of
legal risk in corporations.
Sixth, to encourage suits and improve corporate governance, Germany
should consider relaxing the minority shareholder criteria for bringing
shareholder derivative actions and re-examining the leave procedure.
Conference of Jurists on September 21, 2012, rejected Habersack’s proposal to abolish minority
shareholder conditions and leave procedures for shareholder derivative actions in German law by
an overwhelming vote. The proposal for the abolishment of minority shareholder conditions re-
ceived fourteen votes in favor, fifty-one against, and fifteen abstentions, whereas the proposal for
abolishment of leave proceedings received eight votes in favor, fifty-seven against, and eleven
abstentions.
